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Michaud: Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d 1482

CASE SUMMARIES
Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Claire's Boutiques, Inc.,
949 F.2d 1482 (7th Cir. 1991).
INTRODUCTION
Broadcast Music, Inc., a musical composition

copyright holder, filed a copyright infringement action
against Claire's Boutiques, Inc., owner of a chain of
retail stores, for playing radio broadcasts in its stores

without first obtaining a license from Broadcast Music,
Inc. The District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois found that Claire's Boutique was exempt from
copyright infingement under the home-type exemption of 17 U.S.C. § 110(5), and granted its Motion for
Summary Judgment. In affirming the district court's

holding, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that the home-type exemption

was properly applied to each individual retail store as

opposed to the chain as a whole regardless of the
retailer's financial status, and that under the statute
the "receiving apparatus" included not just the stereo
receiver but all the system components.'

FACTS
The plaintiff, Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI") is a
performing rights organization. BMI is authorized by
individual publishers, authors and composers to
license public performance rights in their musical
compositions.

The defendant, Claire's Boutiques, Inc. ("Claire's")
owns and operates over 700 retail stores throughout
the United States. Claire's provides stereo equipment
to each of its stores. This includes a Radio Shack
Optimus STA-20 5-watt stereo receiver, two Realistic
Minimus 7 speakers, an indoor antenna, and speaker
wire.
Each of the stores uses the stereo equipment to
broadcast music during business hours. The speakers
are ordinarily hung from the ceiling, one in the front
of the store, and one in the back. The speaker wire is
concealed by running it above a dropped ceiling.
BMI asked Claire's to purchase a public performance license for its stores. Claire's counter-offered to
license only its stores which exceed 1055 square feet.
BMI rejected the counter-offer and commenced this
litigation, claiming that Claire's violated the Copyright
Act by playing radio broadcasts in its stores during
business hours. Claire's responded that it was exempt
from liability under the home-type exemption of section 110(5) of the Copyright Act and sought a
Declaratoy Judgement. Section 110(5) exempts persons or institutions who play their radio or television
in a public place if their radio or television is of a
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kind commonly used in private homes.'
Both parties moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted Claire's Motion for Summary
Judgement, and BMI appealed.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The issue before the appellate court was whether
Claire's qualified for exemption from copyright licensing requirements for broadcasting music in its stores
under the home-type exemption, section 110(5) of the
Copyright Act of 1976 ("the Act").5 In resolving the
issue the court looked to the language of the section
110(5) in conjunction with other applicable sections
of the Act, the legislative history of the exemption,'
and other circuits and districts.
Before determining if Claire's sound system fell
under section 110(5), the court first looked to
whether or not Claire's transmission could be defined
as a public performance. Prior to the Act, U.S.
Supreme Court case law defined public performance
as, inter alia,' an initial broadcast by a television or
radio stationA Under this definition, the viewer or lis7
tener was considered a mere "passive viewer."
Congress, however, rejected this definition in the Act.
To perform publicly under the Act now means (1) to
perform works at a place open to the public, or at a
place where a substantial number of persons gathered
other than family or friends; or (2) to transmit this
performance in public or to the public through a
device.8 The court thus determined that Claire's clearly fell under the Act's definition of public performance through the actions of its store managers playing the radio during normal business hours.
Since Claire's act of playing radio music in its
stores was determined a public performance, unless
the court could find an exemption, Claire's would be
liable for infringement. A home-type exemption is
available if (1) a single receiving apparatus is used,
(2) the single receiving apparatus is of a kind commonly used in private homes, (3) the transmission is
provided free of charge, and (4) the transmission is
not "further transmitted" to the public.9 The parties
stipulated that Claire's did not charge to listen to the
broadcasts in its stores.
The court then turned to addressing the "single
receiving apparatus" issue. BMI contended that
Claire's could not claim that it used a "single receiving
apparatus" because, on a corporate-wide basis, it
used 669 receivers. Claire's responded that its activities must be viewed on a store-by-store basis. In
examining the statutory language, the court held the
language "strongly suggests that the proper analysis
should be limited to the area where a single work is
performed." 0 According to the court, Congress in its
legislative history when discussing the exemption
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uses the word "proprietor," indicating companies with
one location or storefront. Congress did not address
in either the statute or legislative history whether all
recievers used commonly by an organization are to
be counted collectively for purposes of the exemption. The plain language of the exemption does not
describe the individuals or groups entitled to the
exemption. The exemption asks whether or not a single apparatus was used.1 The statute does not ask
how many receiving apparati are used, and it speaks
of one performance or work. Thus, the court determined congressional intent was to focus on the type
of single receiver used within a single area, not the
infringing entity, here Claire's corporation collectively.
After determining that the exemption applied to a
single system in a single location, the court examined
the requirement that the receiving apparatus be of the
kind commonly used in private homes, a home-type
system. The court concluded that it should examine
the entire recieving apparatus, not just the single
receiving unit. 2 In examining the entire stereo system,
the court enunciated two ways a company could fall
out of the 110(5) home-type exemption: (1) if the
company used any non-home-type components in its
stereo system; or (2) if it arranged the home-type
components in a way not commonly found in a
home.
Under the first exclusion, the court found that the
components used by Claire's were home-type. The
receivers were small, delivering only 5 watts of
power, and were capable of driving only two speakers. The speakers also were small and had limited
power. Under the second exclusion, the court held
that the configuration of Claire's home-type components was in a way commonly found in a home. To
determine this, the court examined the following factors relating to the system's configuration: number of
speakers used, manner in which the speakers were
installed, use of concealed wiring, distance of speakers from the receiver, and integration of the stereo
system with other technologies.
In this case, these factors did not all support the
same conclusion: the dropped speakers and concealed wiring weighed toward denying the exemption, whereas the limited number of speakers used,
the relative closeness of the speakers to the receiver,
and the lack of integration of the system to other
technologies weighed toward allowing the exemption. The court accorded minimal weight to the
dropped speakers and concealed wiring. They felt
that the important considerations in determining
whether a system is home-type are the type and
sophistication of the equipment used, the size of the
area in which the broadcast is audible, and whether
the equipment has been altered or integrated. The
court noted that when Congress created this exemption, it intended to exempt the type of stereo system
used by the restuarant owner in Twentieth Century
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Music Corp. v. Aiken.15 That system also used dropped
speakers and concealed wiring. The court concluded
that Claire's component configuration was sufficiently
home-type to come within the exemption.
The court then focused on the requirement that
the broadcast not be "further transmitted to the public." BMI argued that Claire's systems initially received
the transmission at the receiver, and then further
transmitted it via wires to other areas. The court
rejected this argument for three reasons. First, the
court determined that in its legislative history,
Congress intended the sound system in Aiken, a radio
presumably connected by wires to four speakers, to
be exempt under section 110(5). Second, the term
"receiving apparatus" in the Act encompasses not just
the receiver but all the components of a music system." Third, the court believed that to further transmit
a performance entails using some device or process
to expand the normal limits of the receiver's capabilities. In so reasoning, the court rejected BMI's contention that Claire's further transmitted the radio
broadcast because the speaker wires passed through
a wall separating the receiver, in the backroom, from
the speakers, in the main store area. Therefore, the
court concluded that Claire's systems did not further
transmit to the public the radio broadcasts received in
their stores merely by sending the music to other
areas within the individual store.
Last, the court addressed the issue whether the
financial size of the alleged infringer's establishment
affects the section 110(5) exemption. BMI interpreted
the legislative history for the proposition that section
110(5) cannot apply to a large profitable business
such as Claire's. Here is where the Seventh Circuit
broke away from other circuits and district courts on
this same issue.
BMI asserted that the terminology in legislative
history-small commercial establishment[s] ... not of
sufficient size to justify, as a practical matter, a subscription to a commercial background music service"-sets forth two requirements." First, it requires
Claire's be a small business, and second, that it not be
of the size and nature that could practically justify a
subscription to background music. While the terminology, "small commercial establishment," is repeated
in several places throughout the history, the court
found unclear whether that terminology refers to the
financial size or physical size of the establishment.
Because the statute itself does not address the
financial strength of the alleged infringer's establishment, the court determined that a rule could not be
invented that was "totally unrelated to the language of
the statute." 6 But, the court futher recognized that to
hold the financial strength of the establishment irrelevant was contrary to several other cases. The court
distinguished the other cases finding that none relied
solely on the financial size or ability of the defendant
when denying the 110(5) exemption. The courts also
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